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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of information asymmetry on 
insider trading activities in hospitality firms. In particular, this study will use a market 
microstructure approach to detect insider trading activities of hospitality firms prior to 
merger announcements. Since the payment type of a merger is determined by private 
managerial information, it can act as a proxy of information asymmetry. Depending on 
the payment type of a merger, insiders may make different transactions with their pri- 
vate share holdings before the merger announcement. Insider selling (buying) activities 
may forecast their firm's negative (positive) abnormal performance after mergers. 
In general, the management of a hospitality corporation is separated from the owner- 
ship of the firm. Thus, managers as well as shareholders and other outsiders may all have 
different information about the value of the firm's real or financial assets and it may be 
many years before all the information is revealed. This information asymmetry implies 
that a hospitality firm's managers may have private information about their firm's true 
valuation and use the information to make managerial decisions related to the type of 
payment offer in a merger. 
There have been no studies of hospitality mergers that have looked at the process 
through which insider information becomes reflected in security prices. This study will 
contribute to provide evidence against the strong-form market efficiency, which private 
information immediately impacts on the stock prices. 
